Informally speaking, an instance-hiding proof system for the function f is a protocol in which a polynomial-time veri er is convinced of the value of f(x) but does not reveal the input x to the provers. We show here that a boolean function f has an instance-hiding proof system if and only if it is the characteristic function of a language in NEXP \ coNEXP. We formalize the notion of zero-knowledge for instance-hiding proof systems with several provers and show that all such systems can be made perfect zero-knowledge.
Introduction
In this paper, we show that every function that has a multiprover interactive proof system in fact has one in which the veri er does not learn the proof, and the provers do not learn what they are proving.
Consider interactive protocols involving a computationally limited veri er V and m 1 powerful provers P 1 ; : : : ; P m in which the provers are allowed to communicate with V , but not with each other.
In an interactive proof system for a language L (cf. 12, 7, 10] ) the input x is on a shared tape, accessible to the veri er and provers. If x is in L, the protocol allows V to obtain convincing evidence of this fact. Because it obtains this evidence, V need not trust the provers to behave correctly. One can also consider interactive proof systems for functions f in which the veri er learns f(x) and obtains convincing evidence of the correctness of this value (cf. 11]).
It is known (cf. 14, 16] ) that the class IP of languages recognized by 1-prover interactive proof systems is equal to the complexity class PSPACE. Furthermore, it is shown in 2] that the class MIP of languages recognized by multi-prover interactive proof systems is equal to the complexity class NEXP = NTIME (2 poly ).
In an instance-hiding scheme for a function f (cf. 1, 4, 5] ), the input x is on a private tape, accessible only to the querier V . The protocol allows V to obtain the value of f(x) without revealing to any prover any information about x (other than its length); however, V does not necessarily obtain any evidence of the the correctness of this value (because of this, the powerful players are referred to as \oracles" in 1, 4, 5] ). In this model, V does not entrust any information about x to the provers, but it does have to trust the provers to behave correctly. Beaver and Feigenbaum 4] have shown that all functions f have multi-prover instance-hiding schemes, thus settling a question of Rivest 15] .
In this paper, we introduce the notion of an instance-hiding proof system for a function f and characterize the functions that have such systems. An instance-hiding proof system is similar to an instance-hiding scheme, except that along with the value of f(x), the protocol allows V to obtain convincing evidence of the correctness of this value. Thus, the veri er need not entrust any information about x to the provers, nor need it trust the provers to behave correctly.
Let fNEXP denote the class of total functions computable by nondeterministic exponential time Turing machine transducers. The restriction of fNEXP to Boolean functions consists of the characteristic functions of languages in NEXP \ coNEXP.
We prove the following.
Theorem 1 Every Boolean function f 2 fNEXP has an instance-hiding proof system.
The fact that MIP = NEXP implies that Theorem 1 is the best possible, since if the function f has an instance-hiding proof system, then clearly f is the characteristic function of a language in MIP \ coMIP, and hence f is in fNEXP.
We also de ne in a natural way the notion of zero-knowledge for instance-hiding proof systems and show that any instance-hiding proof system can be made zeroknowledge. In any type of proof system, the de nition of zero-knowledge should capture the intuitive idea that the provers do not trust the veri er to behave correctly and that the veri er is not to be entrusted with any information other than the fact being proved. The de nition of zero-knowledge for interactive proof systems for a function f on input x captures the intuitive idea that the veri er|even a misbehaving one|learns the value of f(x) and nothing else. In an instance-hiding proof system for a function f, the provers do not know the input x, nor can they infer anything about x (except its size) from the messages they receive from the veri er. Thus they cannot hope to prevent a veri er from learning, say, f(x 0 ) instead of f(x), where jx 0 j = jxj.
Our de nition of a zero-knowledge instance-hiding proof system captures the intuitive idea that the veri er|even a misbehaving one|learns the value of f at exactly one input of length n and nothing else. Thus, in a zero-knowledge instance-hiding proof system, the veri er and the provers do not trust each other to behave correctly, nor do they entrust each other with any non-essential information: The provers learn nothing about x, and the veri er learns nothing but the value of f(x).
For the purpose of constructing zero-knowledge protocols, it is convenient to assume, as in 7] , that the provers have access to a shared random tape that is not accessible to V . In 7] , it is shown that every language in MIP has a zero-knowledge interactive proof system.
Theorem 2 Every Boolean function f 2 fNEXP has a perfect zero-knowledge instance-hiding proof system. The protocols that we construct in order to prove Theorems 1 and 2 involve multiple provers. Feigenbaum and Ostrovsky have recently shown that a function has a one-prover instance-hiding proof system if and only if it has a one-oracle instancehiding scheme and it is in fPSPACE. They have also shown that the existence of a one-way function implies that all one-prover instance-hiding proof systems can be made (computational) zero-knowledge.
We remark that the notion of private/adaptive checker, which was introduced by Blum, Luby and Rubinfeld 9], can be viewed as a restricted form of instance-hiding proof system in which the provers are only asked questions of the form \what is f(y)."
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give the formal de nitions of \instance-hiding proof system" and \zero-knowledge." In Section 3 we prove Theorem 1. In Section 4 we prove Theorem 2, along the way giving a new and simple perfect zero-knowledge protocol for languages in MIP. In Section 5 we state an open problem.
Most of these results rst appeared in our Technical Memorandum 6].
De nitions
We now formally de ne instance-hiding proof systems and the corresponding notion of zero-knowledge. The intuition behind these de nitions can be found in Section 1. Let V , P 1 , : : :, P m be a set of interactive Turing Machines. As in ordinary MIP, the veri er V is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing Machine, the provers P 1 ; : : : ; P m are computationally unbounded, and the veri er can communicate reliably and privately during the protocol with each of the provers, but the provers cannot communicate with each other. Also as in ordinary MIP, the provers have a shared random tape to which the veri er does not have access; however, this random tape is only required in the construction of zero-knowledge instance-hiding proof systems. Unlike ordinary MIP, the input x in an instance-hiding proof system is known only to the veri er. The output produced by V after interacting with a set fP i g of (possibly misbehaving) provers is an element of the set f0; 1; rejectg and is denoted by (V (x); P 1 ; : : : ; P m ). For each prover P i , the transcript T(V; P i ; x) of messages sent between V and P i on input x is a random variable, and its distribution is induced by the random coin-tosses of the veri er and provers.
De nition 2.1 The protocol (V; P 1 ; : : :; P m ) is an instance-hiding proof system for the function f if it satis es the following properties.
(i) For all constants c > 0, for all su ciently large x, Prob((V (x); P 1 ; : : : ; P m ) = f(x)) > 1 ? 1=jxj c :
(ii) For all constants c > 0, for all su ciently large x, for all P 1 ; : : :; P m , Prob((V (x); P 1 ; : : :; P m ) = 2 ff(x); rejectg) < 1=jxj c :
(iii) For all P 1 ; : : : ; P m , for all inputs x and x 0 with jxj = jx 0 j, for 1 i m, the distribution of the transcripts T(V; P i ; x) and T(V; P i ; x 0 ) are the same.
Conditions (i) and (ii) capture the notion of a proof system for a function. Condition (iii) captures the notion of instance-hiding|the protocol leaks no more than the length of x to any individual, isolated prover. However, pairs of transcripts, say T(V; P i ; x) and T(V; P j ; x) may be dependent. Thus pairs of provers must be kept physically separated for two reasons: As in ordinary multiprover systems, colluding provers could cause the veri er to accept a wrong value for f(x); as in ordinary instance-hiding schemes, colluding provers could compute more information about x than its size. A more general de nition of instance-hiding is given in 1]; if we restrict attention to the case in which at most the length of the instance is leaked to the provers, then condition (iii) is equivalent to the de nition in 1].
De nition 2.2 An instance-hiding proof system (V; P 1 ; : : :; P m ) for the function f is computational (resp. statistical, perfect) zero-knowledge if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time veri er V , there is a probabilistic, expected-polynomial-time oracle machine M V (called the simulator) with the following property. During its execution on input x, M V may make exactly one query to an f-oracle, and the query must have length jxj. The distribution of the simulator's output M V (x) is computationally indistinguishable from (resp. statistically indistinguishable from, the same as) the transcripts hT(V ; P 1 ; x); : : :; T(V ; P m ; x)i.
3 Proof of Theorem 1
Arithmetization of Boolean Functions
Let f : f0; 1g ! f0; 1g be any Boolean function.
For any n 1, we denote by K a xed nite eld such that n + 2 jKj = O(n).
Such a eld can be constructed deterministically in polynomial time. In what follows, 1 ; : : :; n+1 will denote xed nonzero elements in K.
We consider the restriction of f to inputs of length n. We de ne a polynomial g 2 K X 1 ; : : :; X n ] in the following way. For each A = (a 1 ; ; a n ) 2 f0; 1g n , let We can of course view g as a function mapping K n into K in the usual way. We make the following simple observations. Proposition 3.1 (i) g(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) = f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) for all (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) 2 f0; 1g n .
(ii) deg g n.
(iii) If f 2 fNEXP, then g 2 fNEXP.
A polynomial such as g which extends f to a larger arithmetic domain is sometimes referred to as an \arithmetization" of f. Arithmetizations were rst used in the context of interactive protocols by Beaver and Feigenbaum 4].
An Instance-Hiding Proof System
Now suppose that f 2 fNEXP, and let g be its arithmetization. Let x = (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) be the input. De ne the language L g as follows. For u 1 , : : :, u n , and v in K, (u 1 ; : : : ; u n ; v) 2 L g if and only if g(u 1 ; : : : ; u n ) = v. Our instance-hiding proof system for f requires 2(n + 1) provers on inputs of length n; we call the provers P 1 ; P 0 1 ; : : : ; P n+1 ; P 0 n+1 .
Protocol A. A1. V picks r 1 ; : : : ; r n 2 K at random, and computes y(i; j) := r j i + x j for i = 1 : : : n + 1 and j = 1 : : : n. For i = 1 : : : n + 1, V sends (y(i; 1); : : :; y(i; n)) to provers P i ; P 0 i .
A2. For i = 1 : : : n + 1: prover P i computes z i := g(y(i; 1); : : :; y(i; n)); P i sends z i to V .
A3. For i = 1 : : : n + 1: P i ; P 0 i prove to V that (y(i; 1); : : :; y(i; n); z i ) 2 L g . A4. V interpolates the points ( i ; z i ) (i = 1 : : : n + 1) to obtain a polynomial w(X) 2 K X]. The constant term of w(X) is equal to f(x).
One must verify that (1) Protocol A is a proof system, and (2) Protocol A is instance-hiding. To prove (1), observe that statements (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3.1 guarantee that the constant term of w(X) in step A4 is indeed equal to f(x). Also, observe that statement (iii) of Proposition 3.1 implies that L g 2 NEXP; therefore, the result of 2] that NEXP = MIP allows us to implement step A3 with one-sided, exponentially small error probability. If the provers follow the protocol, the output of the veri er is always f(x 1 ; : : :; x n ); otherwise, the veri er will accept a wrong answer with exponentially small probability. Claim (2) can be proved using the line of reasoning found in 4]|the essential point is that each y(i; j) is distributed uniformly over K (although pairs y(i; j) and y(k; j) are correlated); these random elements of K leak only the size of the input.
Proof of Theorem 2
The basic steps required to convert Protocol A in Section 3 to a zero-knowledge, instance-hiding proof system are the following.
1. We replace step A3 by a zero-knowledge simulation protocol. 2. In step A2, V learns the value of z i , which it certainly could not compute on its own. We solve this problem by having P i send instead z 0 i := z i + h( i ), where h(X) is a random polynomial over K of degree n and constant term zero. V then interpolates the points ( i ; z 0 i ) in step A4; the constant term of the resulting polynomial has the correct value. As long as the veri er follows the protocol in step A1, z 0 i is just the value of a random polynomial of degree n with constant term f(x 1 ; : : :; x n ), evaluated at i . 3. In step A1, a cheating veri er may not follow the protocol, and may send y(i; j) values that do not correspond in a legitimate way to some point in f0; 1g n . In particular, this would invalidate our x to A2, and could also allow a cheating veri er to learn the value of g at any point in K n , which we do not want to allow. We prevent this by using a distributed function evaluation protocol that will reveal the true values of z 0 1 ; : : :; z 0 n to V only if the y(i; j) values correspond to some input value in f0; 1g n .
The remainder of this section supplies the details of these steps.
Building Blocks
We describe here the subprotocols that are used in our zero-knowledge proof system. These are building blocks that appear elsewhere in the literature or slight variations thereof.
Bit Commitment
Using the shared random tape, simple bit commitment can be implemented in a very simple way as in 7]. In the bit commitment scheme, there are two protocols: a bit commit protocol and a bit reveal protocol. In order to ensure that the scheme works properly, the prover that executes the bit reveal protocol must not have any knowledge of random bits sent by the veri er during the bit commit protocol. One way to guarantee this is simply to dedicate one prover to the task of executing bit reveal protocols.
Committing Shared Random Bits
Several provers can easily commit to the same random bit by simply taking that bit from the shared random tape. Only one of the provers actually executes the bit commit protocol. A group of provers can commit to a set of shared random bits in this fashion, and there is no need to \prove" to the veri er that they committed to the same ones|the ordinary reveal protocol will prevent any cheating.
Multiple-use Notarized Envelopes
In 8] it is shown how to construct a notarized envelope scheme from a protocol for simple bit commitment. There are two protocols: a notarized bit commit protocol and a prove protocol. The notarized bit commit protocol allows a prover to commit a bit. If a is a bit string, we will use the phrase \put a in a notarized envelope" to mean \perform the notarized bit commit protocol for each bit in a." The prove protocol allows a prover to prove one NC 1 predicate 1 involving bits in notarized envelopes in such a way that no information about these bits is revealed (other than that implied by the truth of the predicate), and if the predicate is not true the veri er can catch a cheating prover with probability at least 1=poly.
The restriction that a notarized envelope can be used in only one proof is just an artifact of the implementation that can easily be lifted. Instead of representing a bit b as the sum c 1 c 2 , where c 1 and c 2 are committed using an ordinary bit commitment protocol (as done in 8]), we can represent b as the sum c 1 c m . Using the same techniques as in 8], which involve Barrington's result on bounded-width branching programs 3], this representation allows b to be involved in m?1 proofs, as each proof reveals at most one of the c i 's. This modi cation has the e ect of decreasing slightly the veri er's chances of catching a cheating prover, but the probability is still 1=poly.
Distributed Function Evaluation
We will need a protocol for the following simple version of distributed function evaluation. Let F(u 1 ; : : :; u m ) be an NC 1 function, where the u i 's are bit strings. We have provers P 1 ; : : :; P m and veri er V . Initially, each P i knows u i ; some of the u i may be known to V , whereas others may be in notarized envelopes and unknown to V . At the end of the protocol, V should learn nothing but the value of F(u 1 ; : : : ; u m ), rejecting a wrong answer with probability at least 1=poly; and each of the P i 's should learn nothing.
The statement that V learns nothing but the value of F means that (1) during the protocol, V learns the value of F, and (2) there is a simulation procedure that, when given the value of F, will simulate the conversations that take place during the protocol. The statement that each prover learns nothing means that each prover receives messages that consist of uncorrelated random bits.
We brie y sketch an implementation of the protocol using a variant of Kilian by the value of a single input bit; moreover, the product Q j j is equal to the identity in S 5 if F = 0, and it is equal to some xed nonidentity element in S 5 otherwise. Let 1 ; : : :; m?1 be random permutations in S 5 , and let 0 and m be the identity permutation. Let j = ?1 j?1 j j for j = 1; : : : ; m. Then Q j j = Q j j , and the list of j 's are uniformly distributed apart from satisfying this equality; therefore, nothing can be inferred from the values of j other than the value of F.
The function evaluation protocol runs as follows. The provers put shared random permutations 1 ; : : :; m?1 in notarized envelopes. Each prover P i computes and sends to V the permutations j corresponding to each input bit of u i . For each such j , prover P i proves to V that j was computed correctly. This correctness predicate is an NC 1 predicate involving j , the pair of permutations j?1 and j (which are in notarized envelopes), and the corresponding input bit (which may be in a notarized envelope); therefore, the prove protocol for notarized envelopes described above may be used. Once V has received all such permutations, V can multiply them together to obtain the value of F.
A Zero-Knowledge MIP Protocol
We now describe a perfect zero-knowledge proof system for any language L in MIP. Our protocol is simpler than that in 7], and it will be easy to see that ours can be embedded as a subprotocol in an instance-hiding proof system in which the input bits to the subprotocol are not on a shared input tape, but are in notarized envelopes, or are known initially only to the veri er. Our protocol does not require oblivious transfer or general oblivious circuit evaluation.
A Normal Form
We begin with a normal form for MIP protocols in which the veri er's role is extremely limited.
Proposition 4.1 Any language in L 2 MIP has a 2-prover protocol with the following structure.
Protocol N. N1. V sends a random string r to P 1 , who sends a response a 1 . N2. V sends a random string r 0 to P 1 , who sends a response a 2 . N3. V sends a 2 to P 2 , who sends a response a 3 . N4. V computes an NC 1 acceptance predicate accept(x; r; r 0 ; a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ).
On inputs x 2 L, V accepts with probability 1. On inputs x = 2 L, V rejects with probability at least 1=poly.
Proof (sketch): By the \completeness theorem" of 7] and the \probabilistic oracle machine" characterization of 10], we can assume that there is a poly-time deterministic oracle machine (x; r) such that 1. for all x 2 L, there exists an oracle E such that for all r, E (x; r) = 1;
2. for all x = 2 L, for all oracles E, the probability that E (x; r) = 1 for randomly chosen r is at most 1=3.
The provers choose an oracle E. The veri er V selects a random string r and sends it to P 1 . Then P 1 computes a response a 1 which encodes the entire computation of E (x; r), including all the oracle queries q i ; i = 1 : : : m and oracle answers s i := E(q i ); i = 1 : : : m. V sends a random string r 0 to P 1 , which represents a random number i(r 0 ) between 1 and m. P 1 sends a response a 2 := q i(r 0 ) to the veri er. Now V sends a 2 to P 2 . P 2 sends a response a 3 := E(a 2 ). The acceptance predicate accept(x; r; r 0 ; a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ) just checks that (1) a 1 encodes a valid accepting computation (imposing no constraints on the oracle responses), (2) a 2 = q i(r 0 ) , and (3) a 3 = s i(r 0 ) .
The argument that this protocol has the desired properties is similar to that found in 10].
Zero-Knowledge Simulation
Now we show how to simulate Protocol N in zero-knowledge. The basic idea is the following. The provers will put their responses in notarized envelopes, and the veri er will use the distributed function evaluation protocol to evaluate the acceptance predicate. However, di culties arise in step N3|the response a 2 must somehow be passed to P 2 , (1) without letting V know the value of a 2 , and (2) without relying on V to follow the protocol. The rst problem is solved by having P 1 send a 0 2 := a 2 e to V , where e is a shared random string (of length equal to that of a 2 ) that is put in a notarized envelope at the beginning of the protocol. The second problem is solved by modifying the acceptance predicate so that if V sends anything other than a 0 2 to P 2 , the acceptance predicate becomes trivially true, and hence V can not possibly gain any information by trying to cheat in this way. Since P 2 knows a 0 2 and e, it can recover a 2 and compute its response a 3 .
Here are the details. Let accept 0 (x; r; r 0 ; a 1 ; a 0 2 ; e; c; a 3 ) = (a 0 2 6 = c) _ accept(x; r; r 0 ; a 1 ; a 0 2 e; a 3 ):
The distributed function evaluation protocol will be used in the following protocol to evaluate accept 0 , with P 1 supplying the arguments x; r; r 0 ; a 1 ; a 0 2 ; e and P 2 supplying the arguments c; a 3 .
Protocol Z. Z1. The provers put a shared random string e in a notarized envelope. Z2. V sends r to P 1 ; P 1 puts the response a 1 in a notarized envelope.
Z3. V sends r 0 to P 1 ; P 1 sends a 0 2 := a 2 e to V .
Z4. V sends c := a 0 2 to P 2 ; P 2 puts the response a 3 in a notarized envelope.
Z5. Evaluate the predicate accept 0 (x; r; r 0 ; a 1 ; a 0 2 ; e; c; a 3 ) using the distributed function evaluation protocol.
If x 2 L, the veri er will always accept; otherwise, the veri er will reject with probability at least 1=poly. To reduce the error probability, the protocol can be repeated.
To show that this protocol is perfect zero-knowledge, we describe a simulation program M. In steps Z1{Z4, the messages received by the veri er will just consist of random bits, which M can easily simulate. Since M knows that accept 0 will be true no matter what the veri er does in steps Z1{Z4, M can simulate the conversations that occur during the distributed function evaluation protocol in step Z5.
Clearly, this protocol can be embedded in a larger protocol in which some of the input bits are in notarized envelopes. Up to now it has been implicitly assumed that a third prover is dedicated to the bit reveal protocol. This assumption simpli es the protocol, but those researchers whose budget will allow them to purchase only two provers will be happy to know that two provers will su ce. Very brie y, we can't safely use prover P 2 for revealing committed bits after it has received the message c from V in step Z4. However, P 1 can execute its part of the distributed function evaluation protocol before this occurs, allowing P 2 to be used to reveal bits committed by P 1 during this process. We leave the rest of the details to the interested reader.
A Zero-Knowledge Instance-Hiding Proof System
We now have everything we need to modify Protocol A to obtain a perfect zeroknowledge instance-hiding proof system. We shall the use notation introduced in Section 3.
Let L 0 g be the language de ned as follows. For u 1 ; : : :; u n ; v; 2 K, and h 2 K X] a polynomial of degree n with constant term zero (represented as a list of coe cients), We must show that (1) Protocol B is a proof system, (2) Protocol B is instancehiding, and (3) Protocol B is zero-knowledge.
To prove (1), one can easily show that if the provers follow the protocol, the veri er will always learn the correct value of f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ); otherwise, the veri er will accept the wrong answer with probability at most 1 ? 1=poly. The error probability can be decreased by iterating steps B2{B6 of the protocol.
Property (2) is proven as in Theorem 1. To prove (3), we describe a simulation program M interacting with an arbitrary veri er V . We only discuss the simulation of the distributed function evaluation protocol in step B5; the other parts of the protocol can be easily simulated by virtue of the zero-knowledge properties of the various building blocks.
It will su ce to show how M can obtain the value of F, since this will allow it to then simulate the conversations that occur in the distributed function evaluation protocol. If the y(i; j) values given by V in step B1 do not satisfy the linearity condition, the value of F is (0; : : : ; 0). Otherwise, M can easily recover the corresponding values x 0 1 ; : : :; x 0 n and r 0 1 ; : : : ; r 0 n . M can then consult an f-oracle to obtain f(x 0 1 ; : : :; x 0 n ). Notice that the polynomial w 0 (X) can be written as w 0 (X) = g(r 0 1 X + x 0 1 ; : : :; r 0 n X + x 0 n ) + h(X); and so we see that w 0 (X) is just a random polynomial of degree n over K with constant term equal to f(x 0 1 ; : : : ; x 0 n ). M can generate such a w 0 (X) at random, and then generate the z 0 i values using the formula z 0 i = w 0 ( i ) (i = 1 : : : n+1). The value of F is (z 0 1 ; : : :; z 0 n+1 ).
